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The Intellectual Relationship Between Nietzsche and Freud†

Richard Waugaman*

THERE has been little intensive study of the various intellectual relationships between Friedrich Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud. Two major subjects may be examined. The first is the question of Nietzsche's influence on Freud. The second is a comparison of the thought of the two men. Previous writers have tended to fail to distinguish between these two subjects, because of their attempt to document Nietzsche's anticipation of and influence on Freud's psychoanalytic theories. The work of these writers is important, but significant divergences between Nietzsche and Freud have been neglected in the process. This article begins with a brief review of the evidence that Freud was familiar with and influenced by the writings of Nietzsche. Secondly, there is a comparison of Nietzsche's and Freud's respective outlooks on human motivation, based on Nietzsche's theory of the will to power and Freud's theory of drives.

NIETZSCHE'S INFLUENCE ON FREUD

The likelihood that some of Freud's significant ideas were influenced by Nietzsche's writings will be apparent to anyone who reads closely the works of the two men. Several authors have previously noted this possibility. Ellenberger, for example, states, "For those acquainted with both Nietzsche and Freud, the similarity of their thought is so obvious that there can be no question about the former's influence over the latter" (pp. 276-277). Kant writes, "Freud brought Nietzsche's more aphoristic conceptions into a system" (p. 1418). Tramer, Baudouin, Brandt, and Weyland likewise see Nietzsche as

a forerunner of psychoanalysis. It should be noted that Ellenberger, in his monumental history of dynamic psychiatry, places Nietzsche in the context of a great number of nineteenth-century thinkers who anticipated Freud in various ways.

Nietzsche and Freud deal frequently in their writings with similar subjects, including the importance of drives, the unconscious, guilt, repression, and sublimation. These similarities have been summarized very well by Ellenberger, Tramer, and Kant. Nietzsche's creative life ended in 1889, ten years before the appearance of Freud's first major work, *The Interpretation of Dreams*. Nevertheless, Freud vigorously denied

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† The topic of this article was suggested to me by Walter Kaufmann, who supervised a thesis I wrote on this subject at Princeton. He has been of frequent assistance to me, through both personal contact and his scholarship on Nietzsche. I also want to acknowledge my gratitude to Weston La Barre, who deepened my understanding of Freud.

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having been influenced by Nietzsche. The minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society record Freud's denial (1908):

He does not know Nietzsche's work; occasional attempts at reading it were smothered by an excess of interest. In spite of the similarities which many people have pointed out, he can give the assurance that Nietzsche's ideas have had no influence whatsoever on his own work.¹

However, the minutes go on to report that Freud followed this unequivocal denial with an amusing "Freudian" slip, surely one of the few to be found in Freud's writings:

To demonstrate how complex, and at times peculiar, the origin of new ideas can be, he recounts, on this occasion, how his idea of the sexual etiology of the neuroses developed: three great physicians, Breuer, Charcot, and Chrobak, had expressed this idea in his presence. Yet he recalled this fact only later, when, faced with the repudiation of this concept, he attempted to justify himself.²

It is ironical that Freud thought his anecdote would lend support to his denial of having been influenced by Nietzsche, when its result is quite the opposite. It implies that Freud, both in the case of his idea of the sexual etiology of the neuroses, and with respect to the ideas he derived from Nietzsche, repressed the memory of the source of these ideas. He lifted the repression in the former case only when it became expedient to find support for "his" theory. The reader of Freud's remarks is left with the impression that Freud was simply unwilling to admit Nietzsche's influence on him because expediency required continued repression; but Freud's slip allowed his unconscious to give us the real facts of the matter.

Freud is thus the first to cast doubt on his own denial of having been influ-

enced by Nietzsche. But we need not stop with this bit of evidence. There are two factors whose presence would strengthen the likelihood that Freud was influenced by Nietzsche, and both are implicit in Freud's remarks that an "excess of interest" prevented him from reading the philosopher. The first factor is Freud's attraction to Nietzsche's ideas and admiration for him as a person. The second is his familiarity with Nietzsche's works. We may assume that if Freud had read a fair amount of Nietzsche and admired him and his ideas, some of Nietzsche's thought would probably have had a conscious or unconscious influence on Freud. Furthermore, as Ellenberger points out, "at the time of Freud's early maturity it was not necessary to have studied Nietzsche to be permeated with his thought, seeing how much he was quoted, reviewed, and discussed in every circle and in every journal or newspaper" (p. 277).

The fact that Freud profoundly admired Nietzsche is incontrovertible. Ernest Jones records that Freud "several times said of Nietzsche that he had a more penetrating knowledge of himself than any man who ever lived, or was ever likely to live" (Vol. 2, p. 344). When Arnold Zweig, the German novelist, asked Freud's advice about his plan to write a book on Nietzsche's mental collapse, Freud discouraged him. In his reply to Zweig he remarked of Nietzsche, "In my youth he signified a nobility to which I could not attain" (Jones, Vol. 3, p. 460). As Tramer notes, there is a logical inconsistency in Freud's expressing such high admiration for someone whose works he claimed not to have read: "Here the principle question must be raised, how and on what basis Freud arrived at this judgment of the value of Nietzsche's writings. Memory, perhaps even logic, seems to have abandoned Freud

¹ Federn and Nunberg, Vol. 1, p. 359.

² Federn and Nunberg, Vol. 1, p. 360.

in his reasoning here" (p. 347).

In Freud's writings there is persuasive evidence that he was directly familiar with *Human, All-too-Human*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, and at least indirectly familiar with *The Genealogy of Morals* and *Ecce Homo*—in all, five of Nietzsche's major works. Let us briefly review this evidence.

Freud refers to the 68th aphorism of *Beyond Good and Evil* in *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*. This aphorism, amusingly enough, is an appropriate comment on Freud's denial of having been influenced by Nietzsche: "'I have done that,' says my memory. 'I cannot have done that,' says my pride, and remains inexorable. Eventually—memory yields."³

The Interpretation of Dreams contains a long quotation from Nietzsche:

We can guess how much to the point is Nietzsche's assertion that in dreams "some primaeval relic of humanity is at work which we can now scarcely reach any longer by a direct path." [p. 588]

Here Freud is either paraphrasing or misquoting a passage found in *Human, All-too-human*:

In the dream this primaeval part of humanity is at work in us, for it is the foundation on which higher reason develops, and is still evolving in every man.⁴

Freud refers to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* in a paper, "On an Autobiographically Described Case of Paranoia."⁵ Freud writes that the situation of the patient in question reminded Freud of the emotions expressed in the section of *Zarathustra* entitled "Before Sunrise."

We may assume that Freud gained some familiarity with two more of Nietzsche's works when the Vienna Psy-

choanalytic Society heard talks on the *Genealogy of Morals* (April 1, 1908) and on *Ecce Homo* (October 28, 1908).⁶ Two more certain sources of Freud's awareness of Nietzsche's philosophy are Dr. Joseph Paneth and Lou Andreas-Salomé, both friends of Nietzsche and Freud. As Roazen remarks, "A living person is often a far more valuable source than a book" (p. 85). Of "Frau Lou," Jones states that "Freud admired her greatly and had been very fond of her. . . . He described her as the only real bond between Nietzsche and himself" (Vol. 3, p. 213).⁷

What lies behind Freud's dubious claim that "Nietzsche's ideas have had no influence whatsoever on his own work"? We must reconcile several data: that Freud was familiar with and greatly admired Nietzsche, that he denied having been influenced by Nietzsche, that he recognized the similarity of Nietzsche's ideas to his own, and that he therefore felt compelled to avoid contact with Nietzsche. On these last two points, Freud made the following remarks:

In recent times I have denied myself the great benefit of Nietzsche's work, with the express intent that in the gathering of psychoanalytic impressions I not be impeded by any conceptual anticipations. Therefore I had to be prepared—and I remain so—to renounce all claim to priority in the frequent cases where painstaking psychoanalytic investigation can only confirm the intuitively perceived insights of the philosopher.⁸

The phrase "in recent times," taken together with Freud's remark to Zweig quoted earlier ("in my youth"), suggests that Freud did indeed read Nietzsche in his earlier years, even if he later avoided him. Nearly all of Nietz-

⁶ Federn and Nunberg, Vol. 1, p. 358, Vol. 2, p. 30.

⁷ Freud's relation to Lou Andreas-Salomé is discussed at greater length by Binion in his *Frau Lou*.

⁸ *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 10, p. 53.

³ *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 80.

⁴ *Werke in Drei Bänden*, Vol. 1, p. 455.

⁵ *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 8, p. 290.

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sche's major works were published between 1870 and 1890, when Freud was in his twenties and thirties.

Freud's compelling need to dissociate himself from Nietzsche's ideas is undoubtedly related to his attitude toward philosophy and speculation in general. Ernest Jones once asked Freud how much philosophy he had read. Freud answered, "Very little. As a young man I felt a strong attraction toward speculation and ruthlessly checked it" (Jones, Vol. 1, p. 29). For a highly speculative thinker (e.g., *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*), Freud displayed a remarkable mistrust of the value of speculation. In confronting Nietzsche's ideas, Freud had to concede that speculation had produced insights equaling those that psychoanalysis gained only through laborious scientific investigation.

In an early essay, Nietzsche discussed the enigma that must have troubled Freud—that of the ability of speculation to anticipate the discoveries of rigorous science:

What then is it that brings philosophical thinking so quickly to its goal? Is it different from the thinking that calculates and measures, only by virtue of the greater rapidity with which it covers more ground? No, its feet are propelled by an alien, illogical power—the power of imagination.⁹

Nietzsche obviously placed greater trust in the power of imaginative speculation than did Freud, and Nietzsche's profound achievements through "philosophical thinking" must have posed a constant challenge to Freud, who wanted to restrict himself to the calculating and measuring methods of science. Freud's attitudes toward speculation in general and Nietzsche in particular were in part due to his great desire to establish psychoanalysis as a

scientific discipline at a time when it was generally ostracized by the scientific community. Identification of psychoanalysis with the writings of Nietzsche, under these circumstances, would not have greatly helped Freud's cause. So perhaps we may excuse Freud's denial of influence to some extent as representing his concern for the scientific reputation of psychoanalysis.

A COMPARISON OF NIETZSCHE'S AND FREUD'S THOUGHT

The second topic of this article is Nietzsche's and Freud's respective theories of human motivation. Previous writers have noted resemblances in Nietzsche to some of Freud's psychoanalytic theories, particularly the theory of the unconscious. While these resemblances are undeniable and have important implications for Nietzsche's influence on Freud, the few authors who have compared the two men have restricted themselves to Nietzsche's anticipations of Freud's ideas. There are two flaws in this approach. First, one gets the impression that Nietzsche is judged from the perspective of psychoanalysis, and praised for having said things that sound psychoanalytic, *avant l'heure*. Secondly, and more important, a close reading of the two thinkers reveals profound divergences that underlie almost every superficial similarity. These divergences have never been sufficiently recognized by previous writers, and are therefore emphasized in this article.

Of previous writers, Ellenberger, Tramer, and Kant offer the best comparison of the thought of Nietzsche and Freud. Other writers, such as Baudouin and Brandt, have merely described the more obvious points of similarity. Ricoeur and Foucault compare Nietzsche and Freud in terms of their similar innovations in the philosophy and technique of interpretation. Ricoeur states that both revealed the illusions of conscious-

⁹ *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, p. 40. I have translated *Durchfliegen* "to cover" rather than "to transcend."

ness, but did so in order ultimately to extend, not detract from the importance of consciousness. Similarly, Weyland believes that Freud and Nietzsche destroyed the old system of moral values in order to replace it with a new one; she writes that to consider Freud and Nietzsche amoral "confuses the transmutation of values with their devaluation" (pp. 90, 135).

Both Nietzsche and Freud, as previous writers have noted, rejected traditional nineteenth-century psychology's view that only conscious mental events are of any importance. Said Freud, "It is essential to abandon the overvaluation of the property of being conscious before it becomes possible to form any correct view of the origin of what is mental."¹⁰ Nietzsche agreed:

Consciousness is the last and most recent development in the organic world, and consequently the most unprepared and impotent one. . . . Before a function is trained and mature, it is a danger to the organism: so much the better if it is skillfully tyrannized as long as necessary! Thus is consciousness skillfully tyrannized—and not least because of its pride! People think, here is *the center* of man; his everlasting, eternal, ultimate, and original being!¹¹

This fascinating statement clearly documents Nietzsche's anticipation of Freud's "discovery" of the unconscious, and it is not surprising that this fact has blinded some authors to the vast differences in the respective attitudes toward the unconscious found in Freud and Nietzsche.

Both Nietzsche and Freud maintained that the primary forces of human motivation operate on the unconscious level. But what are these forces? One way to study motivation would be to ask: (1) What do men (consciously) desire? and (2) Why do they act as they do? The traditional answer to both questions is that men desire pleasure (or happiness)

and that their behavior can be understood in terms of that goal. This is essentially the view that Freud took. He diverged only in claiming that our pleasure-seeking motivation is often unconscious.

Nietzsche violently opposed this view of human motivation. He believed that philosophers and psychologists had always confused the result of an action (pleasure) with its true motive:

For millennia, pleasure and the avoidance of displeasure have flatly been asserted as the *motives* for every action. Upon reflection, however, we should conclude that everything would have taken the same course, according to exactly the same sequence of causes and effects, if these states "pleasure and displeasure" had been absent. . . . *In summa*: everything of which we become conscious is a terminal phenomenon, an end—and causes nothing.¹²

In this remarkable passage Nietzsche strips conscious will of every pretense to causal authority, and locates the true causes of our thoughts and actions, by implication, in the unconscious. He not only anticipates Freud's psychology of the unconscious, but goes beyond it, in denying that pleasure is the aim of every action. For Nietzsche, pleasure, although what people consciously desire, is merely the conscious "terminal phenomenon" in the process of motivation and behavior. People are under the illusion that pleasure is their motive, but Nietzsche holds that the real motive of all behavior is the will to power:

All psychology so far has got stuck in moral prejudices and fears; it has not dared to descend into the depths. To understand it as morphology and *the doctrine of the development of the will to power*, as I do—nobody has yet come close to doing this even in thought.¹³

How then is pleasure related to the will to power? Nietzsche does not simply associate (conscious) pleasure with

¹⁰ *Interpretation of Dreams*, p. 651.

¹¹ *Werke in Drei Bänden*, Vol. 2, p. 44.

¹² *The Will to Power*, p. 265, Sec. 478.

¹³ *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 31.

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the possession of power, but with the active increment of power:

The will to grow is of the essence of pleasure: that power increases, that the difference enters consciousness.¹⁴

What is happiness? The feeling that power is *growing*, that resistance is overcome.¹⁵

It seems, a little hindrance that is overcome and immediately followed by another little hindrance that is again overcome—this game of resistance and victory [in coitus] arouses most strongly that general feeling of superabundant, excessive power that constitutes the essence of pleasure.¹⁶

This relation of power to pleasure explains why men have traditionally mistaken pleasure for the cause of their behavior: the will to power is its true cause, but its fulfillment, which is an increase in power, results in the conscious phenomenon of pleasure. Since men are conscious only of this feeling of pleasure, they assume it to be the cause of their behavior.

The will to power is one of Nietzsche's most important concepts but also one of his most misunderstood ideas. There is a prevalent tendency to interpret the will to power at its most literal level as man's aggressiveness, his quest for physical power over others. Freud himself seems to have shared this misconception. In "The Economic Problem of Masochism," Freud says of the death instinct, which is turned outward on the world by the libido, "It is then called the instinct of destruction, of mastery, the will to power."¹⁷ Ellenberger's comparison of Nietzsche and Freud suffers from the same misinterpretation. Ellenberger writes, for example, "In contrast to Freud . . . Nietzsche did not give prevalence to the sexual drive, but to aggressive and self-destructive drives" (p.

277). Comparing Nietzsche with Adler, Ellenberger states that "Nietzsche's will to power is one among other manifestations of the superiority complex, and as Nietzsche had already shown, these aggressive feelings can wear many masks" (p. 612). Ellenberger thus equates the will to power, as did Freud, with the aggressive instincts. Tramer does not discuss the meaning of the will to power, but leaves the matter ambiguous. On the one hand, he speaks of "the will to power and the associated creative power of the self" (p. 325). Yet elsewhere Tramer writes:

If Nietzsche interprets the will to power as a volition, or to put it better, as a volition of becoming stronger or of expansion, we find here the rudiments of what Freud established as the "aggressive drive," which plays such an important role in world affairs, and especially in human life. [p. 332]

A radically different interpretation of the will to power is presented in the works of Kaufmann (1968) and Granier. I share their contention that the will to power is best interpreted as a *creative* force. Several quotations from Nietzsche substantiate this interpretation. Nietzsche was speaking of the creative nature of the will to power when he wrote that philosophy "always creates the world in its own image; it cannot do otherwise. Philosophy is this tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power, to the 'creation of the world' to the *causa prima*."¹⁸ In *Zarathustra*, Nietzsche writes:

The will is a creator. [p. 253]

To will liberates, for to will is to create: thus I teach. [p. 318]

He who wants to create beyond himself has the purest will. [p. 235]

The last quotation indicates what interpretation of creativity Nietzsche has

¹⁴ *The Will to Power*, p. 370, Sec. 695.

¹⁵ *The Antichrist*, p. 570.

¹⁶ *The Will to Power*, p. 371, Sec. 699.

¹⁷ *General Psychological Theory*, p. 194.

¹⁸ *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 16.

in mind: creativity as a transcendent endeavor which goes beyond the self. In the passage below, Nietzsche calls procreation man's "highest expression of power," not because of its relation to the sexual drive, nor because offspring provide the ego with a form of immortality, but because procreation is the highest act of creativity attainable by man—to create a new life is in the truest sense to create beyond oneself:

The tremendous importance the individual accords to the sexual instinct is not a result of its importance for the species, but arises because procreation is the real achievement of the individual and consequently his highest interest, his highest expression of power (not judged from the consciousness but from the center of the whole individuation).¹⁹

This view of sexuality contrasts sharply with that of Freud, who saw the reduction of tension through the orgasm as the goal of coitus. Nietzsche's emphasis on the creative aspect of sexuality is refreshing.

Although Freud, in his long and productive career, frequently revised and expanded the major concepts of psychoanalytic theory, certain themes and trends characterize the whole of his thought. As Jones has noted, there was "a peculiar feature of Freud's thinking throughout his life, his constant proclivity to dualistic ideas" (Vol. 2, p. 320). This dualism took many forms: the ego instincts and sexual instincts, the pleasure principle and reality principle, and the life instinct and death instinct. Nietzsche, as Kaufmann points out (1968, p. 278*n*), described the will to power as a monistic drive which transcended Freud's dichotomies.

Another marked characteristic of Freud's thought was his reductionism. He tended to view drives, and mental life in general, as constantly seeking equilibrium and the reduction of ten-

sion. Indeed, he originally defined pain (*Unlust*) as the presence of tension, and pleasure (*Lust*) as its absence, although he later admitted that certain types of tension could be pleasurable, notably sexual tension. Freud's reductionism is apparent in several quotations.

The source of an instinct is a process of excitation in an organ and the immediate aim of the instinct lies in the removal of this organic stimulus.²⁰

We have conceived the principle which governs all mental processes as a special case of Fechner's *tendency to stability*, and consequently have ascribed to the mental apparatus the aim of extinguishing . . . the quantities of excitation flowing into it.²¹

A better term for a stimulus of instinctual origin is "need."²²

In terms of a distinction drawn by Granier, Freud resembles Schopenhauer more than he does Nietzsche:

Schopenhauer's will [*vouloir*] corresponds to a truncated experience of real activity; it is less an effect which sanctifies itself in a work than a desire which aspires to its satisfaction. When one examines its structure, it is apparent that it is essentially a lack, whereas authentic will [*volonté*]—which Nietzsche calls the will to power—is a *creative demand*. [p. 384]

Granier's contrast between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche is very applicable to our comparison of Nietzsche and Freud. Freudian drive may also be viewed in a negative, reductionistic sense as a "desire which aspires to its satisfaction" (Granier, p. 384). Pleasure, the ultimate goal, is an absence of stimulation. Nietzsche, on the contrary, described the will to power as man's basic drive. The aim of this drive is the increase of power which, far from being any kind of equilibrium, is always a state of higher creative development. In fact, the will to power is

²⁰ Quoted in Jones, Vol. 2, p. 317.

²¹ *General Psychological Theory*, p. 190.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 85.

¹⁹ *The Will to Power*, p. 360, Sec. 680.

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a drive that can never be completely satisfied, since its goal is not any fixed condition, but ever greater power. As Granier writes,

Power is not a question of possession but of *style*. The philosophy of the will to power is not an ontology of Being, but an ontology of *transcendence*. [p. 410]

Freud's reductionism was carried to its ultimate form in his theory of the death instinct. A more regressive characterization of human motivation can scarcely be imagined. Freud writes:

*It seems, then, that an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things, which the living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces.*²³

It would be in contradiction to the conservative nature of the instincts if the goal of life were a state of things which had never yet been attained. . . . then we shall be compelled to say that "*the aim of all life is death.*"²⁴

Freud's emphasis on adaptation to the environment leads him to neglect the importance of the internal forces within organisms:

In the last resort what has left its mark on the development of organisms must be the history of the earth we live in and of its relation to the sun.²⁵

Nietzsche was highly critical of this Darwinian attitude exemplified by Freud:

The influence of "external circumstances" is overestimated by Darwin to a ridiculous extent: the essential thing in the life process is precisely the tremendous shaping, form-creating force working from within which *utilizes* and *exploits* "external circumstances."²⁶

Nietzsche's outlook is clearly different from Freud's. Nietzsche's concept of man's basic motivational drive em-

phasized its spontaneous, active nature, whereas Freud characterized all drives in terms of regression to an earlier state, ultimately to the absence of life. Although Nietzsche realized that human behavior is not always creative and directed toward a higher state of development, he believed that the exceptions represent lower or corrupted forms of the will to power. Kaufmann, in his excellent discussion of this subject, calls these "*faute de mieux*" forms of the will to power (1968, p. 280). If a man cannot master himself, intellectual concepts, or artistic material, and thus cannot be a saint, philosopher, or artist, he may turn instead to the physical mastery over other men (it is said that Hitler had failed in his original ambition to be an artist²⁷). Nevertheless, for Nietzsche it is the saint, philosopher, and artist who express the will to power in its higher and more authentic forms. Here it is not a matter of sublimation of a basically regressive or destructive drive. Aggression, which several previous authors have identified with the will to power, is but one of its "*faute de mieux*" forms.

Since I have described the will to power as a creative drive, perhaps it would be appropriate to explore how Freud explained creativity in terms of his theory. Doing so should not lead to the misunderstanding that Nietzsche meant by the will to power solely artistic creativity. Yet what Freud has to say about art will enlarge the comparison of him and Nietzsche.

On the one hand, Freud occasionally stated that art was not explainable by psychoanalysis: "We have to admit that also the nature of artistic achievement is inaccessible to us psychoanalytically."²⁸ Elsewhere he wrote, "Unfortunately analysis has to lay down its arms before the problem of the creative

²³ *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, pp. 67-68.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *The Will to Power*, p. 344, Sec. 647.

²⁷ See Langer, pp. 115-117.

²⁸ Quoted in Jones, Vol. 3, p. 414.

writer."²⁹ On the other hand, Freud nevertheless attempted to bring the light of psychoanalysis to bear on the artistic process. He discussed art in terms of the pleasure principle and the reality principle. He wrote that artistic creation, and the pleasure experienced in viewing art, were rooted in man's dissatisfaction over the displacement of the pleasure principle of his childhood by the reality principle of the adult world:

The artist is originally a man who turns from reality because he cannot come to terms with the demand for renunciation of instinctual satisfaction as it is first made, and who then in phantasy-life allows full play to his erotic and ambitious wishes. But he finds a way of return from this world of phantasy back to reality; with his special gifts he moulds his phantasies into a new kind of reality, and men concede them a justification as valuable reflections of actual life.³⁰

According to Jones, Freud saw literature as enabling "the reader to respond to the gratification of . . . unconscious wishes in a way that would otherwise be impossible" (Vol. 3, p. 420). Jones writes that Freud believed an artist "must possess an unusual capacity for sublimation and a certain lack of rigidity in the repressions concerned with unconscious conflicts" (Vol. 3, p. 420).

Freud's psychoanalytic discussion of artistic creativity is interesting and of great merit. What is notable for our purpose here is that Freud again takes a reductionistic and regressive approach, defining art as the return to unsatisfied needs of childhood. Although such an analysis might be valid for certain expressions of creativity, it is helpless to explain truly original creativity. It does not, for example, account for the genius of a thinker like Nietzsche, who anticipated so many of psychoanalysis' important discov-

eries.³¹ Surely more is involved here than the pleasure principle and a return to childhood needs.

Their respective interpretations of man's basic drives led Freud and Nietzsche to widely differing accounts of man's cultural accomplishments, such as art, morality, and civilization itself. Freud asserted that all of man's higher creations were based on instinctual repression and sublimation: "Sublimation of instinct is an especially conspicuous feature of cultural development; it is what makes it possible for higher psychological activities, scientific, artistic, or ideological, to play such an important part in civilized life."³² Freud's outlook is understandable, since the only instincts he recognized were of a regressive nature. This being the case, Freud necessarily defined civilization and morality in terms of the domination of instinct.

Nietzsche's attitude toward instincts differed in several respects. He recognized the significance of man's "lower" instincts as did Freud. However, he did not agree with Freud that moral man should keep his instinctual energies under strict control. Nietzsche felt that true psychic health requires an ability to live in harmony with the instincts. Nietzsche viewed the hypertrophy of rationality and a concomitant suppression of the instincts as a sign of weakness: "To have to fight the instincts—that is the formula of decadence."³³ Furthermore, Nietzsche affirmed a drive in man that is stronger and of greater significance than his animal instincts: the will to power. Freud's final view of instincts was that there exists an eternal struggle between life instincts and death instincts. Nietzsche's will to power transcends both

³¹ Cf. Walter Kaufmann's discussion, "Freud and Aspiration," in his *Critique of Religion and Philosophy*.

³² *Civilization and Its Discontents*, p. 44.

³³ *Twilight of the Idols*, p. 479.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *General Psychological Theory*, p. 26.

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these classes of instinct. Its goal is neither life nor death, nor any resting state of being: its goal is ever greater development and creativity. Thus all of man's higher attainments are seen by Nietzsche not as requiring the control of basically regressive drives, but as being the truest expression of man's fundamental drive, the will to power. Nor did Nietzsche see stability and equilibrium as man's ultimate goal in

life. Ontologically, Nietzsche was a disciple of Heraclitus: all is flux.³⁴ It is of the very nature of the will to power that it seeks change, in seeking ever greater power. It is not a matter of a will to *have* power, but of a will to *increase* power.

Nietzsche's influence on Freud and the growth of psychoanalysis is not to be underestimated. Yet zeal to prove Nietzsche's influence should not cloud our awareness of the profound and far-reaching divergences in Nietzsche's and Freud's respective views of man.

³⁴ Cf. Nietzsche's statement in *The Will to Power*: "If one is a philosopher as men have always been philosophers, one cannot see what has been and becomes—one sees only what is. But since nothing is, all that was left to the philosopher as his 'world' was the imaginary" (p. 307, Sec. 570).

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